No. 053-P
March 9, 1994

**PRESS ADVISORY**

Secretary of Defense William J. Perry will speak at the James Forrestal Memorial Award Dinner, which is hosted by the National Security Industrial Association and American Defense Preparedness Association. This event will take place in the Sheraton Ballroom (lower level), Sheraton Washington Hotel, 2660 Woodley Road, Washington, DC at 8:20 p.m., March 10, 1994.

Media interested in covering this event may contact Dave Burpee or Steve Green at (202) 775-1440.

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# NEWS RELEASE

OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PUBLIC AFFAIRS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. · 20301

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**REMARKS EMBARGOED UNTIL 8:00 P.M. (EST)** March 10, 1994

## SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM J. PERRY RECEIVES FORRESTAL MEMORIAL AWARD

Secretary of Defense William J. Perry will accept the James Forrestal Memorial Award from the National Security Industrial Association at a dinner co-hosted by the American Defense Preparedness Association this evening, March 10, at the Washington Sheration Hotel.

A copy of Secretary Perry's prepared remarks is attached.

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**EMBARGOED UNTIL 8:00 P.M.(EST) MARCH 10, 1994**

Remarks prepared for delivery by
Secretary of Defense William J. Perry
National Security Industrial Association
Washington, D.C.
Thursday, March 10, 1994

Less than six weeks ago, I was sworn in as Secretary of Defense. It seems more like six months, with the swirl of events and the significance of the actions taken in that short time. During this period, I have been enormously impressed with the diversity of actions which the Secretary is called on to take. The Secretary of Defense has two key responsibilities: to ensure the appropriate use of military force, and to ensure the readiness of our armed forces should military force be required.

This latter responsibility can be described as a management task -- the task of managing DoD resources so that our armed forces are maintained in such a state of readiness that they can successfully respond to any plausible military challenge. This management task is made exceedingly difficult by the substantial drawdown in defense resources now underway -- a 40 percent reduction in budget over a 10-year period. Indeed, maintaining core capabilities and morale during a major reduction in force is one of the most difficult tasks faced by any manager, in government or in business.

During the past year, when I was serving as Deputy Secretary, I've talked with many of you about the approaches the Department is using to deal with this management challenge. In brief, we are trading off force structure for readiness; we are reducing infrastructure, including military personnel, DoD civilian personnel, and bases; and we are reforming our acquisition system so that we can integrate the defense industrial base into the national industrial base. These are all important challenges, and any one of them would be an appropriate subject for a talk to this audience.

Tonight, however, I don't plan to talk about these management responsibilities, as important as they are. Rather, I plan to talk about my responsibility for the use of military force. This responsibility involves determining when the use of military force is appropriate; authorizing the deployment of military units; and providing the support for our deployed forces. While the Secretary of Defense is not the only advisor to the President on when the use of military force is appropriate, and when it is not appropriate, he does bring a uniquely informed perspective to that crucial question.

When and how to use American military force is one of the most difficult questions facing a President today because of the

complex security problems facing the world. During World War II, we were fighting for our survival as a nation. Consequently, we were committed to use the full military force required for total victory. In our military engagements since World War II, we have never used the full military force available to us. During the Korean War, we did not use nuclear bombs, even when our ground forces were encircled in the Pusan enclave. Similarly, no nuclear weapons were used during the Vietnam War. During Desert Storm, we not only refrained from the use of nuclear weapons, we also showed substantial restraint in our use of conventional weapons, limiting our attacks on Baghdad to cruise missiles and precision-guided munitions directed against military targets, and stopping the war before we had destroyed the Iraqi army. President Bush determined that this limited use of military force was consistent with the limited political objective of liberating Kuwait.

In Bosnia today we have still more limited interests, and therefore our use of military force is correspondingly more limited. We have, for example, agreed to certain very specific uses of air power. But we have decided not to deploy ground forces except in the context of implementing a settlement accepted by all the parties. I'm going to talk tonight about how we determined what use of military power was appropriate in Bosnia, and where that decision is likely to take us in the near future.

This talk does not presume to be a general analysis of how the United States should apply military force in the post-Cold War era. But the problems we see in Bosnia are in some ways representative of a class of national security problems familiar in the world today. It involves a bloody conflict, where the warring factions are motivated by deep-seated hatreds fueled by the aggressive ambitions of leaders bent on establishing a "Greater Serbia." Senator Moynihan has written that "Ethnicity is the great hidden force of our age." Ethnicity is a great force, as he writes, but it is no longer hidden.

As a people, we have become absorbed in the ongoing war in Bosnia. CNN has brought its horrors into our living room, including the appalling slaughter that took place in the marketplace in Sarajevo last month. The human costs of the war -- especially the systematic killing and the ethnic cleansing -- are evident, and deplorable.

But what are the national interests of the United States in this war? It does not involve our supreme national interest; unlike our stake in World War II and the Cold War, our national survival does not hinge on its outcome. So we could just sit it out. Therefore, some have argued that we should sit it out.

We have rejected that option for two reasons. First, we have a compelling national security interest in preventing the

war and its consequences from spreading -- beyond Bosnia or even beyond the Balkans. Second, we have a humanitarian interest in trying to limit the violence and relieve suffering while we work for a peace settlement.

These are real interests, and we take them seriously, but they are limited interests, and they have different priorities in terms of what is at stake for America. Our actions need to be proportional to these interests. How then do we advance these limited interests in an effective way, and with appropriate levels of risk to our people and at an acceptable cost in resources?

Our first emphasis is on actions that can prevent the war from spreading, since this is where our most profound national security interests lie. We have taken one modest but significant action in that regard, which is to deploy a small infantry unit to Macedonia to participate in a U.N. peacekeeping force based there. This peacekeeping force is intended to observe the situation there, and by its presence help deter the war from spreading, which is of particular importance because of the potential of a Macedonian war drawing Greece and Turkey into the conflict. It is that concern of a widened conflict which presents the greatest risk to American interests.

The peacekeeping force in Macedonia is a limited deterrent, but the best way to keep the war from spreading is to stop it as soon as possible. Therefore our primary goal is to promote a negotiated peace settlement among the warring factions. For almost two years, peace talks have been sponsored by the European Community and the U.N., with modest American participation. Since European interests would benefit most from a settlement, it was appropriate for Europe to take the lead. And let me say, we appreciate the hard work our allies have put into resolving this complex and frustrating dispute. Several times a peace agreement seemed close, but each time some obstacle prevented closure.

A month ago, with the peace talks at an impasse, Warren Christopher, under encouragement by several European leaders, introduced a U.S. initiative to meet individually with the warring parties to try and find some new approach to peace. The U.S. envoy, Ambassador Redman, brought the Muslims and the Croats together in a "Framework Agreement" which is the first step in what could be a comprehensive peace agreement. Much hard work lies ahead, but real progress has already been made.

The essential foundation for that initiative was NATO's renewed demonstration of resolve to back up diplomacy with a credible threat of force and to reduce the level of violence while the talks are underway. On February 9, NATO, with leadership from the United States, and in response to a U.N. Security Council request and resolution, agreed to use its air power to stop the artillery bombardment of Sarajevo.

This initiative built on the longstanding NATO-enforced effort to stop the aerial bombardment of cities and stop other uses of tactical air in the war. This was accomplished by establishing a "no fly zone" over Bosnia, and enforcing that policy by basing a formidable NATO air fleet in Italy and the Adriatic to maintain a 24-hour patrol over Bosnia. This NATO fleet has been successful in effectively deterring the aerial bombardment of cities in Bosnia for the past ten months, compared to the frequent bombardment which preceded the establishment of the no-fly zone. The first militarily significant violation occurred last week. NATO warplanes responded by shooting down four of the six violators.

The artillery bombardment of Sarajevo was stopped by establishing a "no bombardment" policy in Sarajevo. NATO said it would make subject to attack any artillery piece that fired into Sarajevo, or was not under U.N. control within the zone extending 20 kilometers from Sarajevo. This policy was motivated by the staggering rate of civilian casualties resulting from the day-to-day bombardment of Sarajevo. There have been 10,000 deaths and 40,000 wounded in Sarajevo, many from artillery bombardments. Since the NATO ultimatum was announced, Sarajevo has gone more than twenty days without any artillery attacks, compared to the months of December and January, when it often received more than a thousand shells a day.

But the fighting still goes on in ways that are difficult to influence with the use of airpower alone -- in particular, the small-arms, close-combat fighting around many cities and villages in Bosnia. So we also have programs to mitigate the effects of the violence resulting from that warfare. The United Nations has 14,000 troops on the ground in Bosnia to that end, and one of their major tasks is to guard the relief convoys that bring food, medicine, and clothing to the beleaguered cities in Bosnia. Here the role of NATO airpower is to provide close air support for the U.N. ground forces if they call for it. Additionally, the United States and other nations have mounted a massive program to deliver relief supplies by airlift and airdrop. This has involved tens of thousands of troops; millions of pounds of food, medicine and supplies; and billions of dollars.

After almost two years of violence and frustrated peace efforts, we seem to be making some progress toward peace in Bosnia. But what are the next steps? And where do they lead? Anyone who tries to forecast events in the Balkans is either brave or foolish. With that caveat, I will proceed bravely, but I hope not foolishly.

Many have proposed that the United States and NATO build on their successful use of airpower to lower the level of violence even further by extending NATO's protection to the other "safe-

area" cities in Bosnia. I believe that any proposed extension of NATO military use should pass the following three tests:
(1) it should enhance the ongoing peace negotiations;
(2) it should lead to a significant reduction in civilian casualties; and,
(3) it should be enforceable by the use of NATO airpower and U.N. ground forces. We do not want to make empty threats!

The NATO ultimatums to stop aerial bombardment and artillery bombardment of Sarajevo passed all of these tests, and all were successful. Extending these ultimatums to safe-area cities where the principal military activity is infantry or guerrilla action in and around urban areas would not be enforceable with NATO airpower. Indeed, trying to use airpower in such situations actually could increase rather than decrease the civilian casualties. I recall the observation from the Vietnam war that "we had to destroy the village in order to save it." On the other hand, as the U.N. commander, Lieutenant General Rose, increases the size and aggressiveness of his ground forces, NATO could very well be called on to provide close air support for U.N. forces, and the NATO air fleet is prepared to do just that.

These military actions by NATO have not only reduced the level of violence in Bosnia, they arguably have been a stimulus to the peace talks by demonstrating the resolve of NATO and, in particular, the United States. And that is what really counts, for the future in Bosnia depends primarily on the outcome of these peace talks.

Last week, as a result of a new American peace initiative, the Bosnian government, the Bosnian Croats and the Republic of Croatia signed a "Framework Agreement." This agreement called for a Federated Republic in the Bosnian government- and Bosnian Croat-controlled portions of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They also agreed on the outlines of a confederation between this new Federated Republic and the Republic of Croatia. This week Ambassador Redman is in Vienna with representatives of these three parties to work out the political details of these accords, including the preparation of a constitution for the new Federation. At the same time, retired General John Galvin is in Croatia with military leaders of the three parties to work out the necessary military arrangements.

All three signers of the Washington accords praised the United States for its leadership in making the accord possible. Indeed, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina said the agreement "would not have been possible without the American leadership." But as he noted, much hard work lies ahead to go from a framework agreement to a federation. Even harder work lies ahead to bring the Bosnian Serbs into these peace talks in a constructive way.

This is where Russia can play a role. There has been some concern about Russia's engagement in Bosnia, given that U.S. and Russian interests in the Balkans do not fully coincide. But so far Russia has played a constructive role by urging the Serbs to comply with NATO's air strike ultimatum. Russia's offer to send civilian observers under U.N. leadership to Tuzla was instrumental in the Serbs' agreeing to let that airport reopen for the delivery of relief supplies. As President Clinton and I have made clear to President Yeltsin and Defense Minister Grachev, we welcome Russia's constructive participation in the peace process.

There are many ways that the progress in Bosnia could be derailed. But with the Serb acceptance of the NATO ultimatum to stop bombarding Sarajevo, and then the Framework Agreement, twice in the past few weeks the worst possible outcome has not happened in Bosnia. This confirms that diplomacy can succeed when backed up by the credible threat of force.

It is difficult to be optimistic about Bosnia after so many months of bloodshed and missed opportunities. But seeing that the worst possible outcome does not always happen gives some cause for hope that the warring parties may sign an agreement that will end the violence. If that happens -- and we should be more hopeful now than we were a few weeks ago -- the United States is prepared to play a major role in implementing a peace agreement. We are prepared, with congressional approval, to send a substantial force to Bosnia under NATO command and control to implement peacekeeping operations.

However, as we contemplate the future, I'm reminded of the story of the scorpion and the frog, which I will transplant from another part of the world where it was first coined. The scorpion and the frog were at the side of the Drina River, and the scorpion wanted to cross, but he couldn't swim. So he asked the frog if he could ride across the river on his back. The frog said, "How do I know you won't sting me?" To which the scorpion replied, "Because if I did that, we'd both drown." So the frog said, "OK, hop on," and they started across the river.

But when they were halfway across, the scorpion stung the frog, who became paralyzed. Just before they sank below the surface of the water, the frog asked the scorpion, "Why did you do that? Now we're both going to drown." To which the scorpion responded, "Well, this is the Balkans."

The conflict in Bosnia today is similar to conflicts underway or threatening to start in many countries of the world, especially in the newly independent states of the former Soviet bloc. All of them have the potential for the appalling violence we're seeing in Bosnia, only on a larger scale. And all of them have the potential for spreading into wider wars. The grimness

of this prospect of widespread war was captured by W.H. Auden when he wrote, on the eve of World War II:

"In the nightmare of the dark,
All the dogs of Europe bark;
And the living nations wait,
Each sequestered in its hate."

The ethnic hatreds and ultranationalist forces loose in the world today will present us with challenges for the foreseeable future. We must learn to deal with these challenges in a way that carefully analyses the national security interests at stake for the United States, and in a way that calibrates our response to the level of our interests. Our response must make full use of the unique leadership role of the United States, and take into account the important but limited role of military power in such challenges. In my talk tonight, I have looked at one case study in such challenges, believing that there are important lessons to be learned both from our failures and from our successes in Bosnia.

Bosnia is a stark example of the seemingly intractable problems facing us in the post-Cold War era, and it is a cautionary tale of the quagmire that awaits us if we become active participants in every civil war erupting in this era. But it also offers some hope that American leadership combined with a selective application of military power can play a constructive role in bringing these wars to an end.

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